TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XXXVI / 2014 / 4 ////// studie / article /////////////////////////////////////////// NOAM CHOMSKY'S CRITIQUE OF MATERIALISM: AN APPRAISAL Abstract: Th is article examines the critique of materialism in the work of Noam Chomsky which treats the doctrine as lacking in any clear content. It is argued that Chomsky's critique is a coherent one drawing on an understanding of the Newtonian revolution in science, on a modular conception of the mind, and on the related conception of epistemic boundedness. Th e article also seeks to demonstrate the limits of Chomsky's position by drawing attention to his use of the third-person point of view in considering the mental and his resulting failure to make good sense of consciousness. Finally, a dual-aspect theory is recommended which would incorporate Chomsky's agnosticism about the nature of matter. Keywords: matter; materialism; Chomsky; Hempel's paradox Zhodnocení kritiky materialismu u Noama Chomského Abstrakt: Článek zkoumá a hodnotí kritiku materialismu v díle Noama Chomského, podle níž je materialismus doktrínou bez jasného obsahu. Ukazuje se, že Chomského kritika je koherentní v tom, že uvádí do souladu interpretaci newtonovské revoluce v přírodní vědě s modulárním pojetím mysli a související teorií kognitivní omezenosti. Dále se tento článek snaží poukázat na problematický rys Chomského kritiky, spočívající v tom, že uznává při zkoumání mysli pouze hledisko třetí osoby. Toto omezení vede k podcenění úlohy a významu vědomí. Závěrem autor navrhuje, že tento nedostatek by bylo možné opravit tím, že bychom Chomského agnostické stanovisko vůči hmotě propojili s teorií dvou aspektů (dual -aspect theory). Klíčová slova: hmota; materialismus; Chomsky; Hempelův paradox JAMES HILL Filosofi cký ústav AV ČR ÚFAR, Filosofi cká fakulta Univerzity Karlovy Nám. J. Palacha 2, 116 38, Praha 1 email / james.hill@volny.cz 438 James Hill Noam Chomsky has expressed reservations about physicalism in many places in his writings and, when viewed together, these diff erent comments amount to a systematic critique. Unlike other philosophical themes in Chomsky's work, such as his innatism, his modular theory of the mind or his arguments against behaviourism, the critique of materialism has received relatively little attention. One prominent critic of Chomsky is even able to nonchalantly pass him off as a materialist.1 Th e principal aim of this paper is to show that Chomsky's opposition to physicalism is backed up by historical and theoretical considerations which make it a powerful and coherent critique. Chomsky draws on fi ndings in diff erent fi elds, including linguistics, neuroscience, psychology and the history of early-modern science. In parts 1–5 I will explore the character of Chomsky's position, and I shall show how two particular themes in his work combine to bolster his case against physicalism. One theme is an understanding of scientifi c progress and an interpretation of what Chomsky calls the "Newtonian revolution"; the other is a theory of human cognitive capacities and their biological grounding. In the fi nal two parts, 6 and 7, I shall point to what I take to be an important limitation of Chomsky's critique of physicalism which relates to phenomenal consciousness, and I shall make a suggestion how this might be remedied. 1. What is physicalism? Th e term "physicalism is of relatively recent origin, coined by Otto Neurath in the 1930s. Sometimes it has been preferred to "materialism" which has been associated with a metaphysical understanding of matter. We shall not be distinguishing between physicalism and materialism here. Aft er all, the distinction is oft en denied by those who are signed up to the doctrine – by David Lewis, for example – and it seems to play little role in Chomsky's critique.2 Physicalism, for our purposes, is the claim that everything in the 1 Daniel Dennett writes that Chomsky, as a scientist, is "presumably a materialist". Daniel DENNETT, Darwin's Dangerous Idea. London: Penguin 1991, p. 387. 2 For a discussion of this terminological issue see Daniel STOLJAR, Physicalism. London – New York: Routledge 2010, Introduction. Work on this study, which is a part of the project "Th e Concept of Consciousness: Its Unity and Variety", has been fi nancially supported by the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR, P 401/12/0833), and has also been supported by Charles University (Program rozvoje vědních oblastí na Univerzitě Karlově č. P13 Racionalita ve vědách o člověku, podprogram Poznání a normativita). 439 Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal universe, including the mind itself, is constituted by the physical. Everything is either physical or in some way reducible to the physical. It is this claim that Chomsky fi nds to be problematic. Now, Chomsky does not reject physicalism because he thinks it can be empirically refuted by pointing to some entity that is indisputably nonphysical. Nor does Chomsky fi nd the assertion of physicalism to involve any internal contradiction, or to otherwise be inconsistent. Chomsky's objection is that the doctrine has no clear content. He thinks that those who advocate physicalism and those who would endeavour to prove it false are both wrong in thinking that there is a substantive doctrine at issue. Chomsky holds this general view about physicalism because he also holds the more particular view that the concept of the "physical" (or the "material"), which must inevitably enter into any characterisation of physicalism, is devoid of clear meaning. At best, talk of "the physical" acts as a placeholder for whatever we discover, or could discover, to be true about nature. He writes: Th ere is no longer any defi nite conception of body. Rather, the material world is whatever we discover it to be, with whatever properties it must be assumed to have for the purposes of explanatory theory.3 Chomsky does allow that the terms "physical", "material", or "body" may serve as "honorifi c designations for what is more or less understood at some particular moment in time".4 He writes: "Since the Newtonian revolution, we speak of the 'physical' world much as we speak of the 'real' truth: for emphasis, but adding nothing."5 Chomsky also allows that the term may have motivational force, expressing and enjoining an endorsement of the methods of natural science. Some physicalists, notably Jeff rey Poland, fi nd this to be enough, and Poland is happy to sign up to a so-called "methodological physicalism".6 But methodological physicalism is little more than an attitude or approach-it is not a fact-stating claim about the world that is susceptible of truth. For this reason most physicalists would fi nd it a thoroughly inadequate rendition of their doctrine, and they would agree with David Papineau when he writes: "Contemporary physicalism is an ontological 3 Noam CHOMSKY, Language and the Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988, p. 144. 4 See Noam CHOMSKY, "Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply Hidden?" Journal of Philosophy, vol. 104, 2009, no. 413, p. 183 (167–200). 5 See ibid, p. 185. 6 See Jeff rey POLAND, "Chomsky's Challenge to Physicalism." In: ANTONY, L. M. – HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 2003, pp. 36–45 (29–48). 440 doctrine rather than a methodological doctrine. It claims that everything is physically constituted, not that everything should be studied by the methods in physical science."7 It is this ontological doctrine that we will be discussing. We should note, however, that Chomsky fully endorses the methods of natural science, and indeed it is this dedication to natural science that leads him doubt that there is any determinate meaning to the physical. He has consistently voiced a preference for the term "methodological naturalism" to express attachment to scientifi c method. Th is, he argues, avoids confusion with the kind of physicalism that Papineau is referring to. So Chomsky is a thoroughgoing naturalist-he accepts a foundational role for the methods of science in investigating the world and establishing our ontology-but he is no physicalist. 2. Chomsky and the "Newtonian Revolution" Many people would object at this point that the materialism can be given a more or less clear defi nition if we treat it as that the subject-matter of the core sciences, particularly physics itself, but also chemistry and perhaps parts of molecular biology. Th ey would look upon this part of science as providing us with a base to which other parts of science and knowledge can, in principle at least, be reduced. But Chomsky resists this attempt to give determinate content to the term because he holds a historical thesis about the progress of science. Th is thesis, perhaps most fully explored in his article "Th e Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply Hidden?" (2009), distinguishes Chomsky's critique of physicalism from that of others, such as Carl Hempel, Bas van Fraassen, Tim Crane and Hugh Mellor, who have also claimed that the term "physicalism" lacks clear meaning. Chomsky is not primarily moved in his rejection of physicalism by the exotic content of quantum mechanics. He holds that the developments in science of the last hundred years merely confi rm what should have been apparent long ago. Physicalism, in Chomsky's view, was already vacuous in the wake of the publication of Newton's Principia in 1687. Chomsky holds that Newton, by attributing to bodies a universal power of attraction, abandoned an ideal of intelligibility that science had hitherto imposed upon itself. Th is ideal had been enshrined in the mechanical philosophy with its intuitive conception of matter as extended, mobile stuff , cohering in bodies of diff erent shapes and sizes. Th e mechanists claimed 7 David PAPINEAU, "Th e Rise of Physicalism." In: Carl GILLETT – Barry LOEWER (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001, p. 3 (3–36). James Hill 441 that body could only act by perspicuous contact-action such as pushing, resisting, defl ecting, or dividing. Body could not act by attraction or repulsion because such forces would not fl ow transparently from the intuitive nature of body. For the same reason bodies could not act at a distance, but must act only where they are: that is, by mechanical impulse. Newton, in Chomsky's view, introduced a diff erent approach to the methodology of science. Th e aim now was not to follow the dictates of a predetermined conception of what the physical is, but rather to posit attributes and powers with a view to achieving adequate explanation of the manifest principles operating in nature. Science was no longer concerned to reduce phenomena to some prior understanding of the physical, but rather: To construct intelligible explanatory theories, taking as "real" what we are led to posit in this quest, and hoping for eventual unifi cation with the "core" natural sciences: unifi cation, not necessarily reduction.8 On Chomsky's reading, the progress of science associated with Newton's theory of gravitation was made possible by a deliberate suspension of judgement about the real nature of "matter" and its action. Chomsky expresses this point in the terminology of Hume, by saying that the Newtonian revolution is one of "mitigated scepticism".9 Newton wished to push on with discovering and describing the manifest laws in nature, unrestricted by some preconception about the essential nature of the stuff under investigation. Indeed, Chomsky is fond of quoting Hume's verdict on Newton: While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored [nature's] ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain.10 Newton's scepticism was shown by his reluctance to elucidate the modus operandi of gravitation, or explain how the force acts – a defi ant stance that is conventionally associated with the slogan "hypotheses non fi ngo". But, to scientifi c enquiry, this scepticism is not obstructive, but rather liberating. It 8 Noam CHOMSKY, "Language and Nature." Mind, vol. 104, 1995, no. 413, p. 2 (1–61). 9 Th e term was, of course, made famous by Hume. See David HUME, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Cambridge University Press 1975, section XII, pp. 161–165. 10 David HUME, History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to Th e Revolution in 1688. Vol. 6. Charlottesville: InteLex 2000, p. 542. Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 442 allows scientists to draw up laws that can express the manifest phenomena without having to conform to a conception of body predetermined by folk intuition. Th e underlying concept of matter and motion – based on conceivability, intelligibility, and common-sense understanding – had to be abandoned, and science had to proceed on an entirely new course in investigating the simplest phenomena of motion, and all other aspects of the world, including mental life ... Th e legitimacy of the steps is [now] determined by criteria of depth of explanation and empirical support, not conceivability and intelligibility of the world that is depicted.11 Newton's new approach to physics, Chomsky notes, was disturbing and paradoxical to scientists at the time and for a long time aft er. He reminds us that Newton himself was never comfortable with the counter-intuitive implications of his physics, and at times was even moved to denounce attraction-at-a-distance as an "absurdity".12 Chomsky also points out that the hope lingered for almost two centuries aft er Newton's Principia, that a mechanistic, or quasi-mechanistic, grounding would be given to the principle of gravitation and to other forces, and that something close to the intuitive conception of the physical might be reinstated.13 But, despite these qualifi cations, Chomsky remains convinced that Newton's achievement in drawing up robust, mathematical laws of motion – unconstrained by any narrow conception of the physical – has immensely positive consequences as an exemplar of scientifi c advance. 3. Th e modular theory of the mind Now the particular strength of Chomsky's position is that he sees a connection between the mitigated scepticism of Newtonian physics and a naturalistic view of the mind that is part of the scientifi c view. Chomsky argues that we need to abandon a conception of mind which he associates with Descartes, who wrote in his Discourse that our rational nature is a "universal 11 CHOMSKY, "Mysteries of Nature," pp. 172 and 177 (167–200). 12 See ibid, p. 171 where Chomsky quotes the famous letter to Richard Bentley of 1693 in which Newton writes that action at a distance is "so great an Absurdity, that I believe no Man who has in philosophical matters a competent Faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it." 13 Noam CHOMSKY, Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988, p. 144. James Hill 443 instrument which can serve for all contingencies".14 On this view – which is as much characteristic of the previous Aristotelio-Scholastic tradition of the "rational soul" as it is of Descartes15 – there are, in principle, no limits to what the mind can understand in nature because it is not a structural part of the organism, but is rather a faculty of the non-material soul. Rejection of this "universal instrument" view of the mind is a key point on which Chomsky, the author of Cartesian Linguistics, diverges from strict Cartesian rationalism. Th e reader may, at this point, think that Chomsky is fi ghting a battle that has already been long won. Who today, one might ask, would agree with the "universal instrument" conception of reason, with its anti-naturalistic ontology? It may survive here and there, but it is hardly mainstream philosophy. And yet, while few may explicitly endorse Descartes' immaterialist ontology, many implicitly assume that human intellect has the universal range with regard to the natural world that Descartes ascribed to it. It is not hard to fi nd an attitude in contemporary philosophy that takes for granted that there are, in principle, no obstacles to our knowing and understanding all aspects of nature. Indeed, it is not uncommon to come across references to a "theory of everything", and to fi nd philosophers and scientists who are optimistic about such a theory being achieved.16 Chomsky thinks this is a sign that many have not learnt the primitive lesson of evolutionary biology: "[...] the theory of evolution places humans fi rmly within the natural world, taking humans to be biological organisms, much like others, hence with capacities that have scope and limits including the cognitive domain."17 14 DESCARTES, Th e Discourse on the Method (1637). Chomsky cites the older English translation, Th e Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by HALDANE, E. S. –ROSS, G. R. T. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1931, vol. 1, quoting p. 116. In the more recent translation, Th e Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by COTTINGHAM, J. – STOOTHOFF, R. – MURDOCH, D. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press 1985, p. 140, it is rendered as "a universal instrument which can be used in all kinds of situations". 15 "It is necessary [...] since the intellect thinks all things, that the intellect be unmixed." ARISTOTLE, De anima. London: Penguin 1986, III. 4., (429a). 16 For a trenchant statement of this view, see Alex ROSENBERG, Th e Atheist's Guide to Reality. London – New York: Norton 2011. He writes that "science's understanding of the world is correct in its fundamentals [and] when 'complete', what science tells us will not be surprisingly diff erent from what science tells us today" (ibid, chapter 1). Th is suggests that there are no limits to our ability to arrive at a complete understanding of the fundamentals of nature, despite our minds having arisen from a blind evolutionary process that cannot guarantee that our belief-forming processes really track the truth. 17 Noam CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We? Dewey Lectures 2013." Journal of Philosophy, vol. 110, 2013, no. 12, p. 683, emphasis JH. Th is thought is, for Chomsky, an obvious Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 444 Just as our bodily organs, as adaptations, allow us to digest, respire, sense (etc) certain objects and not others, so our cognitive abilities are primed to cope with certain tasks, and are not adapted for others. Th is inevitably means that there will some conceptions and hypotheses that are quite beyond the ability of our faculties to entertain or frame. In rejecting the universal instrument view, Chomsky also defends a more specifi c thesis about the nature of mind. Th e mind, he argues, is constituted by a set of cognitive "organs". Th e word "organ" here is not intended in the full literal sense. Chomsky is not committed to mental faculties being embodied in neatly-demarcated units in the brain, just as the liver and the heart are separable parts of our bodies below the neck. Whatever the exact nature of their structural instantiation, however, Chomsky does hold that individual mental faculties have a semi-autonomous ability to function that is captured by the technical term "module". In Chomsky's view the diff erent modules of the mind develop and grow in relative independence from one another, and their operations are, to a signifi cant extent, disociable from one another and from the central systems that monitor or collate their activity. Th is is especially clear in the case of the linguistic faculty which may remain functional in patients who otherwise suff er from severe mental impairments. A modular approach to the mind has, of course, been spelt out and defended in detail by others, particularly by Jerry Fodor. It would be wrong, however, to treat the views of Chomsky and Fodor as identical. Chomsky is less ready than Fodor to reduce the modules of the mind to encapsulated computational systems. Also, and more importantly, Chomsky fi nds Fodor's modularity too restricted, as it concerns only the peripheral input and output mechanisms involved in perception and motor response. Chomsky goes much further than Fodor when, for example, he talks of a module equipped to originate scientifi c hypotheses ("the science-forming faculty"), and a module for moral judgement.18 and banal one, which he describes as "a truism that is sometimes thoughtlessly derided as 'mysterianism'." Noam CHOMSKY, "Opening Remarks." In: PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, M. – URIAGEREKA, J. – SALABURU, P. (eds.), Of Minds and Language: A Dialogue with Noam Chomsky in the Basque Country. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009, p. 18 (13–43). 18 Chomsky is quoted as saying: "Th ere's some instinctive mechanism we have that is a kind of theory construction module of the brain [...] that maps – that constructs – theoretical interpretation from scattered data. And we do it instinctively. And then we check it out by induction and methodology of science and all that kind of stuff ." Michael HALEY – Ronald LUNSFORD, Noam Chomsky. New York: Twayne 1994, p. 182. See also Noam CHOMSKY, "Reply to Lycan." In: ANTONY, L. M. – HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 2003, p. 256. James Hill 445 Fodor and Chomsky agree, however, in drawing a similar epistemological conclusion from modularity which Fodor has termed "epistemic boundedness". Th e selective focus of the diff erent modules of the mind means that while certain kinds of natural properties are highly amenable to human comprehension, other aspects of reality must inevitably transcend our cognitive capacities, "just as rats cannot deal with a prime number maze".19 Highly penetrative faculties that can pick out aspects of the environment, or excogitate precise models or hypotheses, bring with them limits of scope and blind spots. Th ere will inevitably be some concepts or hypotheses that are not available to us. As in a baroque painting, centres of intense illumination are produced by deep shadow in the surrounds. Fodor writes: If each "mental organ" is pretuned to the solution of computational problems with a specifi c sort of structure, then it is surely in the cards that there should be some problems whose structure the mind has no computational resources for coping with [...] it is entirely compatible with a modularity theory that there should be endogenously determined constraints on our mental capacities such that the best science – the true theory of the structure of the world – is not one of the theories we are capable of entertaining.20 Chomsky, like Fodor, holds that the intelligence of a mental organ or module is the result of a preformed internal structure, without which there would be no useful focus. He makes the following biological comparison: "If a zygote had no further genetic instructions constraining its developmental path, it would at best grow into a creature formed solely by physical law, like a snowfl ake, nothing viable."21 And more recently he has written: [I]f the genetic endowment imposed no constraints on growth and development of an organism it could become only a shapeless amoeboid creature, refl ecting accidents of an unanalyzed environment. Th e conditions that prevent a human embryo from becoming an insect play a critical role in determining that it can become a human, and the same holds in the cognitive domain.22 If preformed internal structure is responsible for the viability of the cognitive powers of a module, then it also limits that viability. Th e internal structure may enable a module to have selective focus, but to select is also to limit and 19 CHOMSKY, "Mysteries of Nature," p. 185. 20 Jerry FODOR, Th e Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1983. 21 CHOMSKY, "Mysteries of Nature," p. 185 (167–200). 22 CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We?" p. 684, emphasis JH Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 446 exclude what comes into one's purview. So, for example, if a child's language module is equipped to anticipate the hierarchical syntactical structure of a human language, then it will probably be quite unprepared for a nonhuman "Martian" language, with whatever special forms of grammar that might have. Now, epistemic boundedness is hardly a new idea in philosophy. John Locke and Immanuel Kant are two thinkers who present philosophical outlooks that stress our cognitive limits. But both Locke and Kant, in their different ways, thought that these limits can be traced by philosophical refl ection, and that the non-plus-ultra boundaries of human enquiry can therefore be fairly clearly and defi nitively stated. For Locke, it is his empiricism with its two "fountains" of simple ideas, which limits what we can think about and understand. For Kant it is the forms of sensible intuition, as well as the specifi c categories of the understanding, that determine how we conceive and experience the world, and which limit our grasp of how things are "in themselves". Chomsky has no doubt been infl uenced by adaptations of the Kantian tradition, not least as expressed in the ethology of Nikolaas Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz.23 But his position is also signifi cantly diff erent from an even loosely-Kantian one on this issue. Th is is because Chomsky thinks that we can never delineate the bounds of our cognition with anything approaching certainty. Although the ongoing investigations of science intimate to us, with a greater or lesser degree of probability, where our limits may lie, no conclusive claims should be made. It will never be infallibly certain what is a "puzzle" (a problem that is in principle solvable by our cognitive powers), and a "mystery" (a problem that is not humanly solvable). Th e reasons for this indeterminacy are clear. We know so little about how the brain works that it would be foolish to make any systematic attempt to plot the limits of its powers. And the reason we know so little about the brain presumably is on account of the modules of the brain not having been developed for investigating the brain itself. Th us Chomsky's position ends up being more open and tentative when refl ecting on our limits than, say, the position that has described by Colin McGinn's with the term "cognitive closure". Th ough it has clearly been inspired by Chomsky, McGinn's view 23 Lorenz writes, for example, that "the 'a priori' apparatus of possible experience with all its forms of intuitions and categories is not something immutably determined by factors extraneous to nature but rather something that mirrors the natural laws in contact with which it has evolved in the closest reciprocal interaction ..." Konrad LORENZ, "Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology." In: RUSE, M. (ed.), Philosophy aft er Darwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2009, p. 232 (231–247). James Hill 447 is actually much closer to Locke and Kant because he is willing to off er us a priori reasons for excluding the possibility that we might come to a scientifi c solution of the mind-body problem.24 4. Th e Internal coherence of Chomsky's ppposition to physicalism We have described two themes in Chomsky's thought that underwrite his sceptical attitude to physicalism. Th e fi rst is an understanding of the Newtonian revolution which introduced an open, evolving scientifi c ontology, unconstrained by any fi xed conception of the physical. Th e second is the modular theory of the mind, which brings with it epistemic boundedness, and faculties that are capable of grasping only certain aspects of the natural environment. Th ese two themes seem to have been developed separately in Chomsky's thinking, but they also turn out to be mutually supportive and together they make his opposition to physicalism much more than a defi nitional quibble. We are dealing with a refl ected and coherent critique of the doctrine. Its coherence is reinforced by internal lines of support that connect the separate theses. A fi rst line of support goes from Chomsky's modular theory of the mind to his historical understanding of science. On the modular view, it is only to be expected that there is an intuitive concept of the physical which shapes both the common-sense view of the world and early scientifi c hypotheses. Th is is presumably the result of a biological module for understanding physical objects in our environment. Chomsky thinks that this module predisposes us to the concept of matter in early-modern mechanistic science – a space-fi lling stuff that acts by motion and contact. Th e attempts to cling to this view by Newton's mechanist opponents, as well as the later attempts to fi nd a quasi-mechanical underpinning for physics in the invisible ether, all show the power of this innate cognitive disposition. In addition, the fact that natural sciences have not always made progress by giving us more transparent descriptions of the workings of nature, but also by abandoning attempts to elucidate certain key phenomena, is precisely what we should expect on Chomsky's modular view of the mind. Aft er all, human science is an investigation carried out by our modular brains, 24 Colin McGINN, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" In: Th e Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell 1991, pp. 1–22. Here, for example, McGinn is able to invoke Kant's view about spatiality being the form of outer sensibility to help exclude the possibility of any humanly-accessible solution to the mind-body problem (see p. 12). Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 448 with their inevitable blind-spots and cognitive limitations. Th e history of scientifi c progress, with its uneven focus, and its increasingly patchy intelligibility, thus acts as confi rmation of the Chomskian modular theory of the mind. Chomsky's favoured examples of problems which were never solved, but rather dropped in a tacit admission of their intractability, are free-will, and the very phenomenon of motion.25 We lack a module, he thinks, that might begin to explicate these phenomena. Support is also to be found in the opposite direction: Chomsky's understanding of the progress of science backs up his modular theory of mind. Th e most important evidence for the modular view, as we have said, comes from Chomsky's work on language. He has consistently maintained that our acquisition of language cannot be explained by general mental competences or dispositions, such as association or inductive reasoning. Such general competences would never suffi ce for the child because of the poverty of the linguistic stimulus available to it during its period of learning. So an innate organ for language must be postulated. Th is language module has not yet been successfully located in the brain, nor has its evolutionary emergence been adequately accounted for, but it is a necessary posit, according to Chomsky, given the manifest principles of linguistic competence and what we know from our analytical study of grammar. To reject the module of language because it has not yet been incorporated into neurophysiology or evolutionary theory is to risk playing Leibniz to Newton. Chomsky implies that critics who take this line are like the conservative Hanoverian who grumbled about Newton's force of gravitation being an "occult" or miraculous power because he could not make it fi t into his mechanistic physics. I don't mean to imply that Chomsky denies that the language module will ever be explicable in terms of neurophysiology and evolutionary theory. He would almost certainly allow that possibility, particularly if those two parts of science were to undergo currently-unforeseen developmental shift s. But the important point for Chomsky is that the manifest principles are evidence enough for the language module, and that cognitive science should not be harassed or bullied by theorists from other disciplines who demand a too hasty reduction. Aft er all, the fi rst task must be to give an adequate description of the faculty that is to be the target for reduction. 25 See, for example Noam CHOMSKY, "Reply to Lycan," p. 262 (255-263); and Noam CHOMSKY, "Reply to Poland." In: ANTONY, L. M. – HORNSTEIN, N. (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell 2003, p. 267 (263–265). James Hill 449 It is part of the post-Newtonian heritage, Chomsky thinks, that we lack a clear and certain conception of the essence of matter on which all the different parts of science can rest, and which they must conform to. Special sciences are now free to develop in relative autonomy. Th eir incorporation into other sciences, particularly core sciences, may take a variety of forms, one being the expansion, or transformation of the core sciences themselves. Chomsky treats the example of chemistry as informative. Aft er the mechanical philosophy was abandoned in the wake of Newton, chemistry was able to develop as an independent discipline because no reduction of chemical elements to a circumscribed domain of physics was demanded. Chemistry was made properly consistent with physics more than two centuries later aft er the quantum-theoretic revolution so transformed physics that it could become "unifi ed with a virtually unchanged chemistry".26 So we might say that in this case it was the "lower" part of the edifi ce of natural science that re-invented itself so that accommodation to the "higher" part was made possible. Or – since the lower part is oft en associated with the very meaning of the term "material" – we might say that chemistry became reducible (in principle) to physics only because our conception of the material evolved. 5. Th e distinctive power of Chomsky's opposition to physicalism We are now in a position to say something more precise about Chomsky's rejection of physicalism and how it diff ers from other closely-related critiques of the doctrine. Let us compare Chomsky's critique with what is known as "Hempel's dilemma". Carl Hempel, like Chomsky, held that physicalism is a vacuous doctrine. He argued his case by way of a dilemma which might be put like this: Either the physicalist will defi ne "the physical" by (i) the contents of contemporary physics, or (ii) by the contents of ideal physics. If physicalism is defi ned with reference to contemporary physics, it is clearly false, as no one thinks that physicists now know the whole truth about the world. But if physicalism is defi ned with reference to ideal physics then it is an indeterminate doctrine because it is unclear what would be ruled in and what would be ruled out.27 26 CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We?" p. 669. 27 See STOLJAR, Physicalism, chapter 5 for an in-depth interpretation of Hempel's Dilemma along these lines. Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 450 Let us take this dilemma as a starting point for expressing Chomsky's rejection of physicalism. Chomsky's emphasis on the open and evolving nature of the core sciences since the Newtonian revolution sharpens the dilemma. Contemporary physics becomes open to possible expansion in the future and a complete physics is more obviously indeterminate from the standpoint of the present. But that is only a starting point, for Chomsky would also be keenly aware of an unclarity in the expression "ideal physics" in (ii), the second horn of the dilemma. It is not specifi ed whether we are being asked to consider an "ideal human physics" or an ideal physics per se. Th ese two concepts were not perhaps distinguishable for Hempel with his positivist background. But for Chomsky who, as we have seen, emphasises our cognitive boundedness, they cannot be treated as coinciding as a matter of course. If an ideal physics per se is meant, then we have no reason to think that it is within the cognitive reach of the biologically-fi xed modules that constitute our minds. By the same token, if an ideal human physics is meant we have no reason to assume it will be complete. Indeed, on the contrary, we should expect such physics, given our nature and origin, to be partial and constrained by our contingent biological make-up. Th is is the message of Chomsky's remarks about evolution, as we have already quoted him above as saying: "[...] the theory of evolution places humans fi rmly within the natural world, taking humans to be biological organisms, much like others, hence with capacities that have scope and limits including the cognitive domain."28 Th e overall result is that the gap between the two horns of Hempel's dilemma is indefi nitely widened. Th is undercuts a possible physicalist response to the dilemma that would say that the current state of physics is suffi ciently close to completion to guide us in judging which entities and processes will fi gure in an ideal physics. Th e central claim of physicalism, that the mind is itself constituted by the physical, thus becomes quite vacuous. We have no way of determining whether a complete physics would include an expansion of the physical to include the mental in a non-reductive way. We therefore have no argument at our disposal to foreclose speculation about possible paradigm-shift s in our understanding of the physical, as presented by, say, panpsychism, the quantum theory of consciousness or Russellian monism. It is simply dogmatism on the part of physicalism to assume a rigidly nonmentalistic conception of the physical. 28 CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We?" p. 683. James Hill 451 6. Th e mind and consciousness In the fi nal two parts of this paper I would like to say something more about the relation of the mental to natural science in Chomsky's work, and about the broader question of his understanding of the mental. We have already said that he approaches the mind within a naturalistic, biological framework. But we must add a further important methodological assumption which needs to be made fully explict. In Chomsky's 1959 review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, the classic critique of the behaviourist account of linguistic competence, sometimes seen as marking the beginning of "cognitive science", he voiced two fundamental and abiding features of his approach to the mental. Th e fi rst is widely celebrated. Chomsky rejected Skinner's minimalist approach to cognitive architecture. For Skinner, the child's mind was essentially unstructured – a black box that was thought to react to external stimuli in accord only with certain primitive and universal psychological laws such as aversion and reinforcement. Th is behaviourist approach, Chomsky wrote, makes the fundamental mistake of "refus[ing] to study the contribution of the child to language learning".29 Chomsky's alternative was, and is, to attribute to the mind a rich internal structure that processes information and has innate cognition of universal grammar and other information at its disposal. Th e second feature of Chomsky's position is less oft en remarked upon. It is a crucial point of agreement with Skinner. Chomsky endorses Skinner's understanding of the data that is to be explained by any science dealing with the "higher mental processes", of which language competence is a part.30 Skinner is perfectly right, Chomsky argues early in the review, to take outward behaviour as the raw material for a science of mind. nsofar as independent neurophysiological evidence is not available, it is obvious that inferences concerning the structure of the organism are based on observation of behaviour and outside events.31 29 Noam CHOMSKY. "A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior." Language, vol. 35, 1959, no. 1, p. 58 (26–58). 30 Commenting on a reprint of the review, Chomsky refl ects that his reaction to Skinner's work was intended "as a more general critique of behaviorist [...] speculation as to the nature of higher mental processes." Noam CHOMSKY "Preface to A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior." In: JAKOBOVITS, L. A. – MIRON, M. S. (eds.), Readings in the Psychology of Language. Englewood Cliff s, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967, p. 142 (142–143). 31 CHOMSKY. "A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior," p. 27. Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 452 Here, Chomsky implies that there are two legitimate kinds of data that are the foundation for a science of the mind: data about the brain and its activities (neurophysiological evidence), and observation of the behaviour of the phenotype. Given the paucity of neurophysiological data in the 1950s, when the review was written, Chomsky felt able to endorse Skinner's concentration on behavioural data. In Language and Mind, Chomsky reminds us that: No sane person has ever doubted that behavior provides much of the evidence for this study [science of the mind] – all of the evidence, if we interpret "behavior" in a suffi ciently loose sense.32 Th is emphasis on behaviour in the study of mind is also evident in Chomsky's idiosyncratic yet highly stimulating reading of René Descartes, a version of which has recently been defended in detail by Desmond Clarke.33 Most readers of Descartes on mind concentrate on the importance of our awareness of inner mental states as expressed in the Meditations. Not Chomsky. He focuses on the Discourse where Descartes argues that it is the creativity of linguistic behaviour that is crucial in distinguishing human minds from animals and machines. Chomsky argues that Descartes was recognising his own inability to explain this creativity using res extensa and it was this that led him to posit the immaterial substance of res cogitans. Descartes, on this interpretation, approaches the mind with the eyes of a natural scientist coming upon a complex phenomenon in the environment, not as an introspective meditator who peers into himself. Oddly enough, it seems to be precisely this third person view of the mental, so oft en associated with physicalist orientations, which fi gures in Chomsky's rejection of physicalism. Chomsky thinks that we should not treat mental phenomena as somehow special in comparison with other parts of nature: I understand "mental" to be on a par with "chemical", "optical", or "electrical". [...] We do not seek to determine the true criterion of the chemical, or the mark of the electrical, or the boundaries of the optical.34 32 Noam CHOMSKY. Language and Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006, p. 57. Th e "loose sense" of behaviour presumably allows for neurophysical activities that are becoming increasingly easy to monitor. 33 Desmond M. CLARKE, Descartes's Th eory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, see esp. chapter 6. 34 CHOMSKY, "Language and Nature," p. 1. James Hill 453 More recently, Chomsky underlines this view, opining that we should not seek any special methodology when studying the mind. In particular we should resist a curious tendency to treat mental aspects of the human organism diff erently from so-called "physical" aspects, a kind of methodological dualism, which is more pernicious than Cartesian metaphysical dualism.35 So, for Chomsky, the mental is a natural phenomenon, like the chemical, the optical or the electrical, which presents certain third personal data to the scientist which must be explained, with the ultimate hope that the explanations can be unifi ed with other parts of scientifi c theory, particularly the core sciences. Chomsky thinks there is nothing methodologically peculiar about mental phenomena from the scientifi c view. He holds that examination of mental phenomena is examination of the body, as it behaves, and, more recently he has put emphasis on research into the brain. "I use the term 'mind'", he tells us, as referring to "study of the body – pecifi cally the brain –conducted at a certain level of abstraction".36 Now this assumption not only determines method, it also determines the nature of the phenomena that can be treated by the method. Th e third personal point of view inevitably excludes the felt quality of experience. Aft er all, felt qualities, like, say, the taste of lemon or the characteristic feelings anxiety or nostalgia, are known directly only from the fi rst-personal point of view, when the mind is turned inwards, to the content of its own experience. With the recent interest in the problem of consciousness, the importance of felt qualities – sometimes called qualia – has met with wider recognition. Th ere are some signs that Chomsky is responsive to this interest in consciousness which makes his previous attachment to third-personal data problematic.37 35 CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We?" p. 665. 36 CHOMSKY, "Reply to Lycan," p. 257. 37 Chomsky's interest in the problem of consciousness is visible in the aforementioned exchange with Galen Strawson in Chomsky and his Critics, and in his recent Dewey Lectures where he takes very seriously Th omas Nagel's objections to materialist neo-Darwinism, which are founded – most prominently if not exclusively – on the problem of consciousness. Chomsky's positive assessment of Nagel's thesis is worth quoting at length because of its intrinsic interest: "Th omas Nagel, in recent work that has been highly controversial, writes that 'Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientifi c orthodoxy.' If that turns out to be true, it would not be much of a departure from the history of science." Noam CHOMSKY, "What Kind of Creatures are We?" p. 670. Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal 454 Recognition of phenomenal consciousness brings with it recognition that the mental, as a natural phenomenon, does have a notable peculiarity that other natural phenomena lack. Unlike the chemical, optical, electrical phenomena that Chomsky lists, the mental is known, at least some of the time, from the fi rst-person point of view. If one limits oneself to the thirdpersonal point of view one will either tend to treat felt-qualities as lying outside the domain of science or one will have to smuggle such qualities into what has been called the "heterophenomological" approach, by inadvertently taking for granted the empathy of the experimenter, or one's own empathy as reader of the experimental work.38 7. A proposal While this is not the place to provide detailed argument for a particular view of the mind, I would like to conclude with a suggestion. It is this: Chomsky's case against physicalism may be adapted to the framework of a dual-aspect theory. Th is would involve departing from the assumption about the data of science that we have just mentioned. We would assert, pace Chomsky, that the mental is peculiar in having two aspects. While chemical, optical and electrical phenomena do not have an "inner aspect" (as far as we know), the mental does. It is knowable not only from an external, third-person point of view, but also from an internal, fi rst person point of view – there is "something it is like to be" (to use Th omas Nagel's phrase) in a mental state. Once we have recognised the two aspects of the mental, we can then fully endorse Chomsky's scepticism about "the physical" and his open-minded attitude towards the possibility that the mental may be downwardly incorporated into some modifi cation or transformation of the core sciences. Dual aspect theory is not metaphysical dualism: it does not assert the existence of two quite disparate, and ontologically independent, substances. Rather, it acknowledges that, at our current level of knowledge, the mental has an internal and an external face. Th is fact is among the fundamental data that a naturalistic theory of mind should explain. Once that is acknowledged, dual aspect theory may then join Chomsky in remaining agnostic on two further points: (i) whether humans will ever be able to gain an insight 38 For the proposal of the heterophenomenological method (phenomenology of hetero-the other) see Daniel DENNETT, Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin 1991, pp. 66–98. Dennett states that a theory of consciousness "will have to be constructed from the thirdperson point of view, since all science is constructed from that perspective," (ibid, p. 71) and it seems that Chomsky would have little reason to dissent. James Hill 455 into how mental phenomena might be unifi ed with the core sciences; and (ii) whether that unifi cation would inevitably mean reduction of the mental to existing physical theories, and not rather an expansion of the physical theories to somehow encompass mental phenomena. Th us a Chomskian dual-aspect theorist would not cut mind off from the rest of nature, nor would he or she ignore the peculiar diffi culties of incorporating mental phenomena into a wider naturalistic system. Instead a mitigated scepticism, of the kind that Chomsky associates with our Newtonian heritage, may be consciously embraced, allowing us space to develop a proper appreciation of mental phenomena without rushing into a premature reduction of mind to that most mysterious entity, "matter". Noam Chomsky's Critique of Materialism: An Appraisal